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## Developmental tendencies of the right-wing radicalism in Ukraine

The author concentrates on the problem of right-wing radical oriented parties in Ukraine: their classification, activity, contradictions, development. He shows the main features of the Ukrainian party system in general and points the main features which affect it. The author distinguishes the radicals: Ukraine-oriented and Russia-oriented. I.Stryapko in this article shows the origins of the right-wing ideas, development of Ukrainian right-wing radical parties and shows their evolution and development during last electoral campaigns. He analyses the contradictions inside the right-wing movement and shows their effect on their activity. An important role in the ideological system of the Ukrainian right-wing radicals of the nation is given to the problem of migration. A number of problems could be selected. The first is the problem of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Traditionally, Ukrainian right-wing radicals recognize to be Ukrainians those people, who are primarily a native Ukrainian language and culture bearers. However, taking into consideration that recently «Svoboda» has been quite popular among young people in Russian-speaking regions in eastern Ukraine, a certain change in the approach to this problem could be observed. First of all the spreading of «Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalist» phenomenon. Plenty of attention is paid to Russia-oriented right-wing-radicals. The main region of pro-Russian radicalism was and remains the Crimea. Most of pro-Russian radical parties are concentrated there.

**Key words:** political parties; radical right political parties; the rating of trust; pro-Russian; pro-Ukrainian; public initiatives; the problems of national minorities; Ukrainian nation

### Entry

In this article the main attention is paid on the review and development of right-wing radical parties in Ukraine. The author is convinced that all political parties in Ukraine can be divided into Russia-oriented and Ukraine-oriented. Such division is characteristic also for right-wing radical parties. But at the same time it's not right to identify Russia-oriented or Ukraine-oriented right-wing radical parties with certain national groups (either Russians or Ukrainians). In this case we are speaking about the ideology but not the national identity. The sphere of the scientific analysis of this article includes political parties, which played or are still playing significant role in Ukrainian political system or at least are visible on the political field. The author didn't concentrate his attention on the activity of kwazi-parties, as far as he's convinced that they are out of the political system, because they do not participate in the elections and do not influence public opinion and the political system in general. The attention is also not paid on the different subcultures and influence of music or other art on them, because it wasn't aim of the article.

Despite this the author realizes the importance of these points and shows that “Svoboda” tries to incorporate these subcultures into its political structure.

Under the term “right-wing radicalism” Ukrainian scientists understand two types of parties: neo-fashist (neo-nazist) parties which have got such features: racism, anti-Semitism, authoritarian tendencies, denying of the liberal democratic values and attempts to crush the Parliamentarism. The second type of parties is right-wing populist parties which don't deny democratic values but at the same time are founded on the priority of own nation and rise up the actual questions of the contemporary world such as illegal migration which are not discussed by other traditional parties<sup>1</sup>. Right-wing radical parties in Ukraine don't belong to any of these types, as far as they combine features from both types. Very often such parties mimicry towards traditional conservative parties and don't express xenophobic rhetoric. But the analysis of the speeches of their leaders, newspapers and other electronic media give the opportunity to identify their xenophobia. Taking into consideration the fact that modern Ukrainian right-wing radical parties appeared much later than the European ones and at the same time they use European experience, we can affirm that Ukrainian parties are somewhere in the middle between populist and neo-nazist parties combining both features with the tendency towards populism.

### 1. Features of the political system of Ukraine

In this article I am going to focus on a formation and increasing role of right-wing radical political parties in Ukraine. Firstly, I have to start with the features that affect the structure of the party system in general. First of all, I have to stress the fact that Ukraine has a long historical experience of a multiparty system, and its formation has begun only with the collapse of the USSR. That is why the political parties are perceived by the elites and the society as certain “projects”, designed to perform the function of competition in the struggle for political influence and then, regardless of the outcome, the political parties are falling into decay. This has led to the emergence of a huge number of political parties in the Ukrainian society<sup>2</sup>. Almost all of them are poorly structured and do not carry out the function of communication between society and government institutions, that results in an extremely low level of trust in political parties.

Thus the lack of stable liberal, democratic parties enables a stable existence and growth of popularity of right-wing radical political parties.

Secondly, the rating of trust in government institutions (the President, government, parliament, parties, courts, police) is very low and usually does not exceed 20%<sup>3</sup>. That's why there is a strong protest mood in society that in the future could easily become the basis for right-wing and left-wing radicalism.

Thirdly, all political parties in Ukraine are divided into pro-Ukrainian, which is aimed at the strengthening of Ukrainian statehood and pro-Russian which is oriented in its activity towards


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<sup>1</sup> Шведа Ю. Теорія політичних партій та партійних систем. - Львів: Тріада плюс, 2004.- 528 с.

<sup>2</sup> There are 187 political parties officially registered in Ukraine. – Register of political parties of Ukraine <http://www.minjust.gov.ua/parties>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.uceps.org/ukr/socpolls.php>

Picture 1. Trust / distrust in political parties in Ukraine.



Russia, or operates as agents of influence in Ukraine. This distribution is most clearly displayed in the right-wing radical political parties that promote either pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian ideology.

Fourthly, the statements of political leaders, that in European countries would be perceived as radical ones, in Ukraine are often considered to be political rhetoric. In mass media there were callings to the armed seizure of the state power, but they did not lead to any meaningful response, both from the side of citizens and the police. That is why there was no example of the prohibition of the radical political party in Ukraine<sup>4</sup>, as, for example, it was in Germany.

## 2. Formation and activity of the Ukraine-oriented right-wing radical political parties

Traditionally it is believed that right-wing radicalism arose in Ukraine in the early 90's. At that time the process of creating new political parties had started. At the beginning it was a latent part within a bigger trend of resumption of social life and institutional pluralism. It was watched by the ruling political party of that time - the Communist Party of Ukraine / The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its research institutions. It is not a coincidence that the first publication of the party that appeared in the Communist Ukraine Journal (later "Politics and the Time") came from the pen of Volodymyr Lytvyn, who is well known in Ukraine now. The Communists were preparing for the implementation of the "leading role" in conditions of a dosage democracy and limited pluralism, however they soon lost control over events. The main content of the party life at that time was the abolition of the one-party monopoly of the Communist Party of Ukraine-CPSU, the formation of the first, even non-party, programmed ideological opposition in Parliament (Verhovna Rada) and filling out all the positions of the political spectrum by new parties.

At that time a number of political parties having a right-wing radical direction arose. First of all we are talking about the following political parties: the Ukrainian National Party (UNP,

<sup>4</sup> The only exclusion was the prohibition of the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine, but during the electoral campaign 2002 the Constitutional Court made a decision that this prohibition was illegal.

1989-90) All-Ukrainian Association “State Independence of Ukraine (DSU, 1990), Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA, 1991), Social-nationalist Party of Ukraine (SNPU, 1993), and pro-Russian Radical Parties: RDK (later the Russian Party of Crimea), “The Civil Congress of Ukraine (CKU, 1992-1993). Some authors also refer the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UKRP, 1992); OUN in Ukraine (1992); Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN, 1993), Ukrainian National-Conservative party (UNKP, 1992)<sup>5</sup> to the right-wing radical but these organizations since their establishment had not been right-wing radical, as they were founded by Ukrainian leaders from the U.S. and Canada who were carriers of democratic values. In Ukraine they were headed by distinguished artists and dissidents who were the pioneers of the struggle for human right-wings and democracy in the USSR (John Kandyba), or representatives of Ukrainian diaspora (J. Stetsko.) The heads of these organizations were poorly familiar with the party work, or did not know the political realities of Ukraine. Thus they were not able to obtain benefits from its activities, and then the split within these organizations started and they gradually got marginalized and radicalized.

As for Ukrainian National Party (UNP), All-Ukrainian Union “The State Independence of Ukraine (SIU), Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), Social-nationalist Party of Ukraine (SNPU) RDK (later the Russian Party of Crimea), Ukraine” The Civil Congress (CCU), they are from the very beginning of its formation were standing at right-wing radical positions. It should be noted that some right-wing radical political parties were created by Soviet Secret Services in order to discredit the national-democratic parties. It is the Ukrainian National Party<sup>6</sup>, which had no clear ideology and any political purpose, but was actively engaged into various political provocation at mass events organized by moderate political forces<sup>7</sup>.

The Civil Congress of Ukraine was formed by Russian secret services from right-wing pro-Russian radical parties<sup>8</sup>. However, most parties were created at the bottom, as a result of manifestation of public initiatives, but in early 90-ies of 20th century an ideological separation of pro-Ukrainian and pro right-wing radicals could be traced.

In the early 90’s of the twentieth century right-wing radicals started their ideological formation, had no clearly defined system of values, and though had some common traits. First of all, this idea of nation as the highest value on that basis determined the rejection of internationalism of communist ideology, which was identified by the right-wing radicals as a Russification and assimilation of Ukrainian people<sup>9</sup>. Besides communism as an ideology, and specific figures of the Communist Party were accused of crimes against the Ukrainian culture, nation, of persecution of Ukrainian dissidents. An additional stimulus for right-wing radicals was the fact that the Communists were supporters of preservation and later of Soviet Union revival, and therefore were identified with native Russian imperialist ideas. That’s why the struggle against communism in

<sup>5</sup> Пуфлер Е. Партийна система незалежної України // Нова політика. - 1997. - №1. - С. 45., Політичні партії України / За ред. В.М.Якушика. - К., 1996. - С. 56.

<sup>6</sup> Гарань О.В. Убити дракона. З історії Руху та нових партій України. - Київ: Либідь, 1993. - С. 57.

<sup>7</sup> Політичні партії України / Під ред. проф. В.М.Якушика; авторський колектив: О.П.Голобуцький, Т.Г.Криворучко, В.О.Кулик, В.М.Якушик. - Київ: Вир, 1996. - С. 129.

<sup>8</sup> Гарань О.В. Убити дракона. З історії Руху та нових партій України. - Київ: Либідь, 1993. - С. 83.

<sup>9</sup> Якимович Я. СНПУ: офіційний вихід на люди // За вільну Україну. - № 146. - 1995. - С.1.

Ukraine was seen as both struggle with the Russian great-power chauvinism and opposition's attempts to restore Russian Empire<sup>10</sup>.

In contrast to the idea of restoring the Soviet Union right-wing radicals reproduced the idea of Ukrainian Empire (UNA-UNSO party, APU), which should reach all the lands inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians<sup>11</sup>. It was primarily talked about alienation of lands populated by ethnic Ukrainians from Russia (Kuban and of Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov regions) and Poland (Eastern Galicia), as well as part of Moldova. These right-wing radicals quite rarely raised territorial claims to Czechoslovakia (later Slovakia) or Belarus. This idea took hold among right-wing radicals to mid 90's of 20th century. However, not all accepted it and most of them concentrated not on trying to create the empire, but on the problems of Ukrainian statehood strengthening. The main step was the prohibition and condemnation of the communist ideology, lustration, and a mandatory consolidation of Ukrainian language as a state one. I should be noticed that right-wing radicals treated negatively to democratical changes and political parties, which defended human rights as the highest value but at the same time determined a need for a bigger Ukrainian capital.

As to the problems of national minorities, there were actually two of them: Russians and Jews. All the others were paid much less attention, and the right-wing radical did not have a consolidated position at the beginning of their activity. The vast majority treated negatively toward minorities, especially Russians, seeing them as the main source of danger of Ukraine's independence<sup>12</sup>. As for the Jews a sharply negative attitude to them starts to be observed later. In the surrounding there was a current of right-wing radicals, which offered to involve ethnic minorities, especially Jews in the struggle for strengthening of Ukrainian statehood<sup>13</sup>. In particular Roman Koval's position was to advocated cooperation with the Jewish, but eventually he was declared to be «Zion's representative» and expelled from the APU. It should be noted that among right-wing radicals in the early 90's of the 20th century. There were no severe anti-migrant rhetoric or racism.

Finally I want to emphasize the position of right-wing radicals as to religion. Most of them had a clear and consistent position, but at the same time it was different for each party. For example UNA-UNSO representatives proclaimed orthodoxy to be the official religion<sup>14</sup>, the representatives of APUs preferred neopaganism<sup>15</sup>, NUNF (Native Ukrainian National Faith, and it's founder Leo Sylenko has been introduced in Ukraine by the Diaspora from the USA and Canada), SNPU - Greek Catholics. The religious aspect was an additional factor in the confrontation between the right-wing radicals and largely prevented their unification.

Organizational centers of the pro-Ukrainian right-wing radical parties except for the UNA-UNSO were concentrated in Kyiv and Lviv, within the area of Galicia. All of them did not pay much attention to the development, creation of centralized party structures, and some, as APUs,

<sup>10</sup> Щербатюк А.. Основи санації // Нескорена нація. – №16. –1993. – С. 14.

<sup>11</sup> Яворський В. Відлуння великої України // Напря́м. – №3. – 1992. – С. 3; Чечило В. Українська імперія як фактор виживання слов'янської цивілізації // Голос Нації. – № 23-24. – 1994. – С. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Щербатюк А.. Основи санації // Нескорена нація. – №16. –1993. – С. 15.

<sup>13</sup> Яворський В. Відлуння великої України // Напря́м. – №3. – 1992. – С. 4;

<sup>14</sup> Корчинський Д. Подолати себе, відновити церемоніал // Замкова гора. – №7. – 1993. – 5.

<sup>15</sup> Політичні партії України / Під ред. проф. В.М.Якушика; авторський колектив: О.П.Голобуцький, Т.Г.Криворучко, В.О.Кулик, В.М.Якушик. – Київ: Вир, 1996. – С. 137.

for a long time did not register itself as a political party. We could say that these political organizations were rather a federation of various organizations than political parties.

As for practical political activity, here each party has got its own niche. Thus SNPU considered itself to be the party of the award type, and consciously had chosen the role of intellectual force in the right-wing radical surrounding. Its members tend to have a higher education or even were university students. So party focused on the spreading of the European tradition of right-wing radicalism in Ukraine. In particular, in “The Social nationalist” newspaper the articles and interviews of Le Pen and his political party and the program of Austrian Freedom “are published.

UNP and APUs soon ceased their operations, and UNA-UNSO became the most effective right-wing radical party. It originated in 1991 as an organization of self-defense against the attempts of DKNS (HKCHP) to restore the communist’s rule in Ukraine. Yuri Shukhevych, son of UPA commander Roman Shukhevych became its head. The representatives of this political force actively opposed the efforts to restore the Soviet Union, and took part in the breaking up of pro-Russian organizations throughout Ukraine and CPU offices’ capture, in destroying of the monuments of the communist era, communist meetings’ crackdown. In 1992 UNSD archers participated in the conflict in Trans-Dniester Moldova Republic (PMR)<sup>16</sup> on the side of the Slav population against Moldova. This action UNSO was ambiguously perceived by national forces. Some people accused UNSO of betraying in Russia’s favor, because together with UNSD on the side of the TMR the Russian Cossacks and “barkashovtsi” were involved in military actions. Others suggested that it was a strategic mistake of Shukhevych and Korchynsky since strong united Moldova is the key to a stability in the region, and that deprived Romania and of opportunity to the claim to Bukovina and Transnistria. UNA-UNSO itself justified its actions by protecting Ukrainian population in Transnistria from Moldova aggression. In addition, UNSO staying in PMR has caused numerous sympathies of local people to Ukraine and created a powerful pro-Ukrainian lobby<sup>17</sup>. Except the war in Transdnistria UNA-UNSO members were actively involved Abkhazian on the side of Georgia and Chechen wars on the side of the Chechens.

As the organization has a membership of military units, the Ministry of Justice refused to register it as a political party. At the same time, the government knowing about military units was not trying to block its activity<sup>18</sup>. The politics of the government was more balanced in order not to provoke violence. UNA-UNSO was not prohibited, but its impact on the population was limited, and the breakdowns were provoked.

As for the right-wing radical political parties participating in elections, here they were not successful. Their representatives were elected to several regional bodies, but they were never elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Among the causes of a poor support right-wing radicals should include the following:

1. The weakness of organizational structure, that did not allow them to mobilize voters in their support, and some of them have ignored the elections<sup>19</sup>. Then they gradually getting marginalized and lose their impact.

<sup>16</sup> Вітович О. Війна як спосіб буття // Замкова гора. – №2. – 1992. – С. 6.

<sup>17</sup> УНСОвці: самі про себе // Народна газета. – № 24. – 1992. – С. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Рахманін С. Тепер в Україні закон писан и для воєнізованих формувань // Київські ведомості. – 12 ноябрь 1993. – С. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Родіонов В. Ідейно-теоретичні засади українського національного консерватизму // Український час. – №2. – 1995. – С.5.

2. The right-wing radicals often existed as an organization, but not as a party. That's why they did not participate in elections and their influence on the society was limited. Over the time, these organizations lost meaning, and then broke up.

3. The competition among right-wing radicals. In Ukraine, there was a large variety of organizations and parties (OUN, UNP, APUs, UNA-UNSO SNPU), that often crushed. All of them opposed not only communists but even to each other in order to get the right-wing "to express the interests of the Ukrainian nation."

4. The activity of right-wing radical organizations and parties had a regional dimension. Thus they all operated within the region of Western Ukraine and Kyiv. This was favored by the fact that the activity of pro-Ukrainian right-wing radicals was negatively perceived in eastern and southern Ukraine. That's why, despite their activity, the support level for such parties in the society remained quite low.

5. The lack of the access to media resources, and hence the impossibility to lead an active propaganda. Magazines and newspapers that were published by right-wing radicals had a limited edition and were not public. At the same time they had no free access to television or radio.

6. The gradual weakening of the Communist Party in the mid 90's of 20th century. And so the lost of the main stimulus of political activity.

Many analysts and politicians saw the basic problem of Ukrainian policy in confronting the ultra-left and left (communists and socialists), who continued to operate with traditional Communist methods and only the Communists were the only at that time who had a clearly defined social base and considerable influence, and ultra-right-wing (eg, UNA-UNSO), which often resorted to violent actions against their rivals. Since the communists had to withstand even the national-democrats, who often attributed to their radicalism and deliberately tried to equate with the right-wing radicals.

In the mid 90's of 20th century centrist parties, which very quickly weaken the influence of both right-wing and left-wing radicals arose and became stronger in Ukraine. At this time the activity of several right-wing radical political parties was ceased. UNA-UNSO, tried to find the way out of this situation that is to modernize its ideology, to refuse from too radical program provisions and to establish cooperation with the political parties of the center. In 1998 a part of its leadership (including the head of the executive committee UNA Victor Miroshnyk) moved to a pro-government SDPU. D. Korchynsky a deputy chairman that left the UNA-UNSO organization and created the Brotherhood was accused of collaboration with one of the leaders of SDPU and in the future head of the Administration of President Leonid Kuchma Viktor Medvedchuk. After participating UNA-UNSO in the "Ukraine Without Kuchma" action where its members were the main paramilitary force, 300 members of the party were sentenced and its leaders had to moved to other political parties (e.g. A. Shkil moved into the Yulia Tymoshenko block). Pro-Ukrainian right-wing radical parties found themselves in the ideological and organizational crisis and their activity had declined for a while. Though they continued to participate in the elections at various levels, but without any success. But more moderate political forces continued to attract right-wing radicals in their electoral lists in order to avoid dissipation of the votes.

### 3. The formation and activity of the political party “Svoboda”

The strengthening of the right-wing radical political parties in Ukraine is starting from 2005 and it was connected with the activity of the political party The Ukrainian Union “Liberty” (Svoboda). On February 14, 2004 in USNP a split occurred. Its moderate part initiated to reform the party, make it more moderate and open and rename political USNP in to “Svoboda”<sup>20</sup>(a name borrowed from the Austrian party) and O. Tyahnybok was elected its leader<sup>21</sup>. APU, which at that time got marginalized, entered a newly created party as well as USNP. The party entered the block of Viktor Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine”, as soon as O. Tyahnybok was within the “Our Ukraine” fraction in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Moreover negotiations as to the joining to the “Svoboda” and NUC (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists), OUN (Bandera) and OUN (in Ukraine) and as to the creation on this basis of powerful right-wing party were led. On July 4, 2004 the X-th Congress of “Svoboda” decided to unite with the above forces<sup>22</sup>. To tell the truth the unification failed due to a conflict between the head of “Svoboda” Oleg Tyahnybok and KUN chairman Oleksiy Ivchenko as to the point who should head the newly established party.

In July 2004 the head of “Svoboda” O. Tyahnybok was excluded from the fraction “Our Ukraine” for the scandalous statements that incite ethnic strife (the “moskal-jewish mafia, which controls the Ukraine), and Yushchenko publicly distanced himself from O. Tyahnybok. However, «Freedom” members actively participated in anti-government actions of the Orange Revolution, including the blocking of the Presidential Administration, Cabinet of Ministers and the penetration into parliament, and guarded by protesters. Perhaps O. Tyahnybok expected that after the victory of Yushchenko he will be able to establish cooperation with Our Ukraine, but such plans were not realized. That’s why in 2005, “Svoboda” from support goes to the criticism of President for: unclear national, language policy concessions to Russia, the weakness and indecision, the lack of economic reforms, the betrayal of national interests, and soon becomes the opposition to it.

Most political experts expected that the “Svoboda” would repeat the path of other right-wing radical parties, i.e. it would split, or it would remain a notorious regional political party. However, it differed significantly from the previous right-wing radicals, who allowed it to increase its influence in the society. First of all the principle of leadership through which the party avoided its inner crises and splits in spite of the fact that O. Tyahnybok remains the only party leader. Secondly, unlike its predecessors “Svoboda” fundamentally refuses to enter into various inner-party associations and of block creations. That allowed to avoid the dependence on other political forces, political compromises and to concentrate on keeping its party line. Thus, in the eyes of party voters it becomes one of the principal political forces, which positions itself as the defender of national interests rather than purely party or personal interests. Thirdly, an undermining activity against other right-wing radical political parties enabled it to recruit new members, while weakening their rivals. Fourthly, the orientation not on the regional but on all-Ukrainian level. Although Galicia remains the party core region, but unlike its predecessors “Svoboda” actively extends its influence on to other regions of Ukraine. First of all, the creation of a branched organizational network, which facilitates of parties coordination and the opportunity to participate

<sup>20</sup> That is why on the web-site of ministry of justice of Ukraine mentioned the date of registration of VO Svoboda 16.10.1995 № 686 <http://www.minjust.gov.ua/parties>

<sup>21</sup> Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода» [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/istoriya/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/)

<sup>22</sup> Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода» [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/istoriya/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/)

in all levels of elections throughout Ukraine. So on May 1, 2011 party had registered 605 structural units<sup>23</sup> in Ukraine and 15 thousand members<sup>24</sup>. In addition, the strengthening of “Svoboda” was due to the fact that up to 2004 either pro-Ukrainian right-wing radical party actively operated in Ukraine. Thus, “Svoboda” could easily occupy a niche in the party system of Ukraine. It should be added that unlike their predecessors, today’s right-wing radicals obtained more media opportunities to promote their ideas, especially through the Internet, the main users of which in Ukraine young people are. That’s why, it is mainly young people are the members of the right-wing radical political parties.

Since its emergence “Svoboda” survived a certain evolution from extreme radical to a more moderate political party. This evolution was a necessary step, because, otherwise, it would repeat the path of its predecessors with the gradual marginalization. One of the first tasks was to define its ideological orientation and a sharply separate it of fascism or Nazism. It remained problematic for the party that it was often identified as neo-fascist (optional Nazi, xenophobic, racist organization). The creation of positive or even neutral public opinion has become a priority task. «Svoboda» positions itself as a nationalist and conservative party. Due to its activity on the Internet and social networks a positive image among youth was created. It was also contributed by a massive disappointment in liberal nationalism of Yushchenko and the economic and social problems worsening in Ukraine.

It should be noted that right-wing radical parties in Ukraine in confrontation with the Communists resorted to borrowing ideas and principles which were specific to left parties. For example «Svoboda» in many aspects follows the Communists in membership. Party members are divided on party members, candidates for the party and their status is an unofficial (candidates for the party members are people who have applied but have not passed the security services. This last group of supporters are the ones who for some reason do not wish to join the party or party is unwilling to grant them membership (i.e. skinhead groups), but actively cooperates with such people). The second borrowing was the theory of Permanent Revolution. This borrowing was done for two reasons: firstly, the Ukrainian right-wing radicals emphasize economic and social issues, combined with socio-cultural issues in order to expand its mass base<sup>25</sup>. This allowed them to increase their influence not only in western Ukraine, but also in southeastern Ukraine, where they managed to press down the “Our Ukraine”. Meanwhile the right-wing radicals took away a major ideological superiority of the left parties - a fighter for social justice that was frankly recognized by the leaders of “Svoboda”<sup>26</sup>. The only fundamental difference between right-wing and left-wing radical parties in the social sphere is that right-wing radicals support the idea of private property and reject the collective one and the left, allowing the existence of different forms of ownership, prefer a collective ownership. Secondly, the idea of revolution allows the party to be protest, and it unites its members.

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<sup>23</sup> Реєстр політичних партій України. <http://www.minjust.gov.ua/parties>

<sup>24</sup> Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода». [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/istoriya/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/)

<sup>25</sup> Ілленко А. Соціал-націоналізм і революції // <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/dopysy/019904/>

<sup>26</sup> Ілленко А. Соціал-націоналізм і революції // <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/dopysy/019904/>

#### 4. The analysis of the party program of “Svoboda”

A Party Program “Ukrainian’s Defense Program” originally consisted of 7 sections: “Ukrainian Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Overcoming consequences and justice”, “OUN-UPA. Recognition and appreciation”, “Language. Protecting and spreading”, “Informational Space. Liberation and national security”, “Migration. Right-wing to homeland”, “Energy. Independence and Security”, “Society. Social and national justice”. On June 27, 2008 at the nineteenth party congress a new version of the “Ukrainian’s Defense Program” was adopted to which new sections were added and the previous ones were significantly supplemented. Today the program consists of eight chapters: “The government and society. Radical cleaning and equitable system, “National economy. Economic independence and social justice“, ”National Health. Overcoming the demographic crisis and and improving a life quality“, ”Citizenship and migration. The right-wing to a homeland and protection of a vital space“, ”Informational environment and education. Identity protection and cultural development“, ”Historical justice. State continuity and overcoming consequences of occupation“, ”Foreign policy and defense. European Ukrainian centrism and strong state“, ”Crimea and Sevastopol. The Establishment of the Constitutional order and stable development provision.”<sup>27</sup>

“Svoboda’s” program is based on anti-communism. Pro-Ukrainian right-wing radicals accuse Communists in the destruction of the Ukrainian state in 1917-1920 and in extermination of Ukrainian elite (20-30-ies of XX century.) repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia (20-30-ies of XX century.) in genocide of Ukrainian nation (Holodomor(famine)1932-1933)<sup>28</sup> and in attempt to assimilate the Ukrainians, dismissive attitude toward Ukrainian culture and language. Therefore, the fundamental values of communism: the internationalism of class, egalitarianism, teamwork was proclaimed as those that harm the interests of the Ukrainian nation. Actually, “Svoboda” carried out the bill that would ban the Communist ideology and implement the lustration among civil servants and politicians<sup>29</sup>.

Another basic element of the ideology of right-wing radicals is pro-Ukrainian anti-liberalism. It is used to appear in a discourse which purpose should be the undermining of intellectual legitimacy of liberalism by attacking the following key aspects of liberal democracy, as materialism, individualism, universal human right-wings, egalitarianism, multiculturalism and others. Thus such undermining is made by a quite legitimized ways. For example, by searching of the Third Way of Development, the theoretical justification of the primacy of human nation or state, etc., they emphasize the role of traditional values (family, church, national culture, traditions)<sup>30</sup>, which is generally positively perceived by the population. Anti-globalists are the part of this process, which is considered as a resistance strategy of ethnic communities in the struggle to preserve its national “me”, their culture, way of thinking and living<sup>31</sup>. It should be noted that despite the constant criticism of liberalism and democracy, the right-wing radicals

<sup>27</sup> Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода» [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/istoriya/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/)

<sup>28</sup> Програма захисту українців. - [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/prohrama/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/)

<sup>29</sup> Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода» [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/istoriya/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/)

<sup>30</sup> Михальчишин Ю. Аксіоми соціал-націоналізму. - <http://www.vatra.org.ua/sotsial-natsionalizm/aksiomy-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html>

<sup>31</sup> Михальчишин Ю. Аксіоми соціал-націоналізму. - <http://www.vatra.org.ua/sotsial-natsionalizm/aksiomy-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html>

are acting within the democratic system. They use pluralism and a competitive environment to achieve their goal. Thus they can act on the verge of permissible but never against the existing democratic system in order to avoid the ban on their activities.

An important role in the ideological system of the Ukrainian right-wing radicals of the nation is given to the problem of migration. A number of problems could be selected. The first is the problem of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Traditionally, Ukrainian right-wing radicals recognize to be Ukrainians those people, who are primarily a native Ukrainian language and culture bearer. However, taking into consideration that recently “Svoboda” has been quite popular among young people in Russian-speaking regions in eastern Ukraine, a certain change in the approach to this problem could be observed. First of all the spreading of “Russian-speaking the Ukrainian nationalist” phenomenon. They are mostly young people using Russian in everyday life but nevertheless they are consistent supporters of Ukrainian nationalism, positively relate to strengthening of Ukrainian statehood, support the idea of a united Ukrainian state language and broadening its scope, support OUN-UPA and Bandera’s activity, and define Russia as the main enemy of Ukraine. Many of these people are members of “Svoboda”, or a part of its partner organizations such as the “Patriot of Ukraine in Kharkov. Right-wing radicals are positive as to the category of Ukrainians in case they learn and use Ukrainian language.

The second problem is the problem of understanding of the nation and the place of minorities. The nation is understood as a blood-cultural community. This clearly negative attitude can be traced only as to members of certain ethnic minorities. It is mostly representatives of Jews, Hungarians, Russians and Romanians in recent times. However the “Ukrainian’s Defense Program” contained discriminatory provisions as to national minorities, including the restoration of PASSPORTS nationality determined by the nationality of parents, and not by a personal identity. Thus ethnic Ukrainian should get an advantage over non-Ukrainian in all social spheres<sup>32</sup>.

As for the issue of migrant here the right-wing radicals do not have a clear position. On the one hand they have a negative attitude towards migration and offer its maximum limitation as well as to make of Ukrainian citizenship acquisition to be more complicated<sup>33</sup>. On the other hand the need for cultural assimilation of immigrants, followed by ethnic-national assimilation is determined<sup>34</sup>.

In foreign policy, “Svoboda” calls for increasing the role of Ukraine and for aggressive foreign policy. For this purpose the restoration of the nuclear potential of Ukraine was proposed. Meanwhile the right-wing radicals being supporters of isolationism oppose to the integration either into the CIS or the EU, although they do not tell about this.

It should be noted that the party has no official confessional orientation, unlike the pro-Russian right-wing radicals. This area is declared to be a personal matter of each person, but it should be noted that the “Svoboda” is tend to support the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

An important place in the ideology and practice is given to rehabilitation of warriors (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), who organize annual “UPA torchlight procession” in different cities of Ukraine in recognition of Holodomor 1932-1933 as a genocide of Ukrainians and for Ukrainian

<sup>32</sup> Програма захисту українців. - [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/prohrama/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/)

<sup>33</sup> Програма захисту українців. - [http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro\\_partiyu/prohrama/](http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/)

<sup>34</sup> Мартинець В. Чи дбати нам про чистоту раси. - <http://www.vatra.org.ua/rasa/volodymyr-martynets-chy-dbaty-nam-pro-chystotu-rasy.html>

language support as well as for limitation of Russian operation scope. It was mentioned above as for actualization of the social and economic problems.


“Svoboda” has a number of vassal or partner organizations, mostly youth, and maintains relationships with soccer fans who profess the far right-wing ideology. Speaking about the partnership of this first “Patriot of Ukraine”, which operates in Kharkiv it consists of football fans of Metalist Kharkiv, as well as various youth sports groups. Recently, the representatives of the organization have also appeared in Donetsk and Luhansk. “The Ukrainian Alternative” is the ultra-right-wing youth organization operating in Chernigov.

“Glory and Honor” is a youth organization that works in Odessa, Zaporizhskaya Sich “Zaporizhzhia Kyiv,” RID- Kyiv. In addition there is an active collaboration with Cossack organizations. Today, “Svoboda” is actually the only pro-Ukrainian right-wing radical political party. Others, such as Ukrainian Conservative Party, do not show any activity.

### 5. Electoral activity of “Svoboda”

Beginning from 2006 “Svoboda” has actively participated in all elections in Ukraine. The parliamentary elections of 2006 (see pic. 2) became the first in which “Svoboda” took part. The results of the election were minor, only 0,36% of votes, and that’s why most political analysts predicted it the role of marginal political force. At the same time, Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko’s block surely won in Galicia, the base region of “Svoboda”. It should be noted that it was hard for right-wing radicals to hope for serious results, as party has only recently started to operate as an independent political force.

Picture 2. The result of Svoboda on the parliamentary elections 2006<sup>35</sup>




<sup>35</sup> Вибори до Верховної Ради України 2006 р. <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/w6p001>

An extraordinary parliamentary elections, which took place in 2007 (pic. 3) showed some growth of “Svoboda” influence. However, an overall result was so small and 0,76% of votes were not taken into consideration. Only in three regions the party has more than 3% (see pic 3) It was necessary to score more than 3% of the vote) in order to pass into parliament. In 2007, the reformatting among direct competitors of right-wing radicals is taking place. “Our Ukraine” is gradually losing its position, while the popularity of BYT is growing. However BYT was not a party but an electoral block, which united around the charismatic figure of Yulia Tymoshenko, so a little attention was paid to the establishment of party structures in the regions. In this regard, “Svoboda” had a certain advantage since it did not depend on political allies and was more focused on creating of organizational network. The biggest challenge of right-wing radicals was the problem of lack of the access to media resources, which did not allow propagandizing effectively.

The debates and struggle between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the absence of economical, social and political reforms led to a ratings dropping both of Our Ukraine and BYT. Besides there was a split in Our Ukraine. A number of influential members created their own party projects: Gritsenko’s “Civil Position”, Yatsenyuk’s “Front for Change”, Kyrylenko’s “For Ukraine”. Under such conditions, political experts warned that part of the electorate dissatisfied with the current situation in the country would vote for “Svoboda”. The effect of protesting voting for right-wing radicals occurred at extraordinary elections to Ternopil Regional Council in 2009 where “Svoboda” received 34.69% of votes<sup>36</sup>.

Picture 3.<sup>37</sup> Special elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2007. “Svoboda” results in the regions.




<sup>36</sup> Позачергові вибори до Тернопільської обласної ради 2009. - [http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96\\_%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8\\_%D0%B4%D0%BE\\_%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%97\\_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%97\\_%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8\\_2009](http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96_%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8_%D0%B4%D0%BE_%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%97_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%97_%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8_2009)

<sup>37</sup> Позачергові вибори до Верховної Ради України 2007 р. <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2007/w6p001>

During the presidential election in 2010 O.Tyagnibok was a candidate for President, but he got only 1.43% of votes<sup>38</sup>. In the second round of the elections “Svoboda” did not support any candidate for President of Ukraine. On the eve of local elections, the right-wing radicals conducted an active propaganda campaign against the policies of President Yanukovich. In particular, they were protesting against the signing of Kharkiv agreements that extended the deadline for the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 45 years, against pro-Russian foreign policy and especially against the Minister of Education D. Tabachnik, aimed at forcing the Ukrainian language out of education. Despite the active anti-presidential propaganda, “Svoboda” first gained wide representation in the media space. Such a broad access to media is the evidence of authorities’ efforts to use “Svoboda” to undermine the position of BYT in Western Ukraine. We should add that on the eve of local elections in many places, for example in Lviv region, Yulia Tymoshenko’s block was not admitted to the election (by means of various technologies)<sup>39</sup>. Also worth mentioning the falling ratings of the Yulia Tymoshenko and the absence of an extensive party network of “Rodina” party since the blocks were not authorized for election).

The next reason for success of right-wing radicals was the absence of pro-Ukrainian oriented party. Instead of it, a great number of small right-wing parties were competing each other: Front for Change, Civil position, For Ukraine, the Ukrainian People’s Party, Our Ukraine, Batkivshina, etc. Some of them appeared even later than the Svoboda. As a result, at local elections, “Svoboda” had deputies in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Volyn, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Kyiv oblast, and in Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk representatives of “Freedom” became the Heads of regional councils.

Picture 4. Elections to regional councils in 2010 . “Svoboda” results in the regions.



<sup>38</sup> Вибори Президента України 2010 р. - <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011>

<sup>39</sup> As a rule there were such technologies used as: parallel to the existing party cell of Batkivshchina has been created one more cell- clone, and then using court decision the original cell of Batkivshchina was expelled from the electoral process, or the original cell was proclaimed to be the clone. One more manipulative technology was the judicial prohibition for blocks to participate in the local elections. This rule appears only in August 2010, and the elections themselves were in October 2010. that is how BYT couldn't have enough time to get ready for the new consequences.

Not less actively party carries out various rallies, pickets and other mass events. Often, the party members have resorted to illegal and violent actions. For example Svoboda members were blamed in Memorable Mark the Transition of the Hungarian tribes through the Carpathians arson and beating up pro-Russian activists.

One could argue that consolidation is happening around pro-Ukrainian Party “Svoboda”. The refusal of regional concentration and its activity on the transformation of all-political force, focusing on social and economic issues rather than purely cultural and national have become the main difference from the predecessors. At the same time, its success was due to the crisis among competitors of BYT and Our Ukraine, due to an ideological and organizational crisis in the surrounding of moderate pro-Ukrainian political parties.

## 6. Formation and the activity of the pro-Russian right-wing radical political parties in Ukraine

According to the 1989's population census 1 22,1% (11,3 million) Russians lived in Ukraine<sup>40</sup>. Being independent from the country they gradually began to lose the status of preference (first in the political and in cultural sense) nation that was a result of social and political processes that deployed in the young state. A creation of pro-Russian political parties as an instrument, which would ensure participation in government and influence policy-making has become its turn, one of the consequences of changing the status of Russian and the recognition of their national minority.

As for the pro-Russian right-wing radicals at the beginning of 90's century their influence was very insignificant. In the first years after obtaining independence of Ukraine there was a particularly active radical left party of communist direction. There was a paradoxical situation in Ukraine when within the country the special services of Russia struggled with the left and Ukraine actively supported them. The main region of pro-Russian radicalism was and remains the Crimea. Most of pro-Russian radical parties are concentrated there.

A right-wing radical pro-Russian organization Russian National unity (RNE) was formed in 1990 in Odessa and was headed by O. Barkashov the goal of which was to save former USSR areas under control of Russia and participates in the war in Moldova and Georgia. Several more far-right-wing organizations RPK (later the Russian Party of Crimea), “Civil Congress of Ukraine (CCU, 1992-1993), have appeared but soon due to reduction of support Russian security services their activities are getting halted.

These political organizations actively defended the idea of saving the former USSR under the control of Russia, and in the future the revival of the Russian Empire. However their ambition to attempt to maintain only Slavic states Ukraine and Belarus in which many Ukrainians and Russians have lived, in orbit are quickly getting down. This key role was assigned to the saving of priority status of Russians and Russian language and culture, which should ensure the domination of Russia. With time, the idea of Pan-Slavism is covering their surrounding. The political forces mentioned above were unsympathetic to Communism, but soon took over the idea of monarchism from France the Russian Diaspora<sup>41</sup>. In general, their activities were within Odessa

<sup>40</sup> Національний склад населення України за даними переписів населення [http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/nationality\\_population/graphic#m1](http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/nationality_population/graphic#m1)

<sup>41</sup> Кремень В., Базовкін С. Політичні партії України: порівняльний аналіз програмних документів. – К., 1993. – С. 81.

and the Crimea and they did not have a significant impact in other Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. For a long time the most active pro-Russian parties were radical left: the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), led by Petro Symonenko, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (Progressive) - led by Vitrenko that worked actively throughout Ukraine.

It's worth to note, that Slavophil ideas are widely spread in the environment not only pro-Russian right-wing radicals, but they became a part of the basis of pro-Russian radical left parties, especially Progressive one. Beginning from 1998 in all-Ukrainian surrounding there were parties which members were somehow accentuated their love for Slavs regularly appeared (almost every year). Then, in September 1998 a party "Russian-Ukrainian Union" was registered, in January 1999 - "Rus Yedyna" in March of that year - "Edyna Kyiv Rus, in August 2000 - Light from the East, in March 2001 - Russian block in June 2003 - "Slavic people's patriotic union"<sup>42</sup>.

Modern pro-Russian right-wing radical political parties are beginning to take shape and go to the political arena while the influence of radical left pro-Russian parties, including Communist Party is gradually falling. So, in December 1999 party Rodyna headed by Igor Markov was established party in Odessa, and in March 2001 "Russian Block"<sup>43</sup>, headed by G. Basov and A. Svistunov and based on the parties "For United Russia", "Russian-Ukrainian Union", the Union Party was created.

There were hard to make distinguishes between radical left and right-wing radical -Russian party, acting in Ukraine. So there were many common features like slavophilism, Russian chauvinism, opposition to Ukrainian independence in the basis of their ideology. Thus the idea of a White Russian Orthodox Empire (White - in terms of ideology, resistance to communism), was widely spread among the pro-Russian right-wing radicals and on this basis a negative attitude towards left.

It is slavophilism and the recognition of a specific historical mission of the Slavs is in the basis of ideological structure of pro-Russian right-wing radicals. Though in their interpretation slavophilism is rather a Russian chauvinism. First of all it's because of that it concerns only Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Serbs and it is directed to eliminate the state of these nations, to lose their national identity, their dissolution in the Slavonic, and in fact within the limits of Russian state. In the program provisions slavophilism is almost not presented, but in printed bodies of both parties it was paid a significant attention. Thus, pro-Russian right-wing Radical Party does not recognize the existence of the Ukrainian nation, which is treated as foreign intelligence special services and project and aimed at the destruction of Slavic unity. Such rhetoric used by conservative circles of the Russian Empire in late nineteenth early twentieth century. Then the Ukrainian question of the Empire was interpreted as the Austrian or German provocation. Modern pro-Russian right-wing radicals, like their predecessors, while making definition of the Ukrainian nation prefer the term "Malorossy" or "Malorossia population".

Such openly chauvinistic attitude of the Ukrainian nation puts "Rodina" and "Russian block" in the marginal category. And most of pro-Russian population in south-eastern Ukraine does not support such slogans. Mostly pro-Russian parties do not deny the existence of the Ukrainian nation, and emphasize the need to keep in touch with Russia. So the party "Rodina" and "Russian Block" have converted into reservation for the most chauvinistic pro-Russian elements. To

<sup>42</sup> Дмитриев Т., Фетисов М. Левые // Мыслящая Россия. Картография современных интеллектуальных направлений / Под. ред. В. Куренного. – М. : „Наследие Евразии”, 2006. – С. 94 – 116.

<sup>43</sup> Реєстр політичних партій України. <http://www.minjust.gov.ua/parties>

tell the truth it was not announce in the party program statements as for non-recognition of independence of the Ukrainian nation<sup>44</sup> in order to avoid the ban on their activities. However, the analysis of printed and Internet resources of parties states that these materials regularly appear<sup>45</sup>.

The second ideological core of pro-Russian right-wing radicals' negative attitude towards the Ukrainian statehood follows from the non-recognition of the Ukrainian nation. In this case, the party platforms more openly express their position<sup>46</sup>. Basically it manifests itself in explaining the collapse of the Soviet Union as one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century and in emphasis on the negative role of the "Ukrainian nationalists" in the Soviet collapse. It would be ideal for right-wing pro-Russian radicals to integrate into Russia, which is meant under the integration into three Slavic states Russia, Ukraine and Belarus<sup>47</sup>. An important element of the program provisions is an attempt to consolidate the Russian as the second official language in Ukraine. Thus both parties are trying to prove that the Russian language and culture in Ukraine are discriminated<sup>48</sup>. The main argument that comes out of sociological surveys' data, which record that traditionally Russian, was the language of culture in Ukraine. Another argument is the attempt to persuade that Russian language opens access to Russian culture. In fact, these arguments are nothing more than interpretation of implicit inferiority of Ukrainian language and culture and attempt to preserve the advantages of the Russian language and culture, which they used in Soviet times.

Another feature of the substance of pro-Russian ultra right-wings is the formation of Russian Orthodox identity. It is Orthodoxy which is the rods of national identity and pillar of Russian Empire recovery. Then the communists were criticized for contempt to the religion and their trying to destroy the Orthodox Church. In the confessional conflict in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate and Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate the last one is being stood up for<sup>49</sup>. It is also worth to note that right-wing radical religious intolerance towards other confessional groups, especially Catholics and Greek Catholics, and towards members of other religious communities.

In general, pro-Russian right-wing radicals negatively treats the Communists because of the destruction of the Russian Empire, the murder of the royal family, the repression of the Orthodox Church, the tolerance to national minorities, including Ukrainians. Nevertheless the Soviet Union is treated as a form of Russian empire, and its victory in World War II as the greatest achievement. That's why, any form of national liberation struggle, including OUN, UPA, and dissidents

<sup>44</sup> Програма партії. - <http://rodina.od.ua/programmnye-tezisy-partii-rodina>, Передвиборча програма політичних партій «Руський блок». - <http://www.rblok.org.ua/pls/vd2010/printblob?pf7171=190&kodvib=400>

<sup>45</sup> As an example can serve the newspaper "Russian truth" («Русская правда»), which belongs to party "Russian block. Almost in each issue of the newspaper appear materials, which directly point the unrecognizing of the fact of Ukrainian nation existence. Also Odessa's television ATB regularly shows such videos.

<sup>46</sup> In the programs they use the term "project "Ukrainian state" collapsed, "independence" and so on. According to the Ukrainian grammar in brackets are used the words which have the ironic sence. - Програма партії. - <http://rodina.od.ua/programmnye-tezisy-partii-rodina>

<sup>47</sup> Програма партії. - <http://rodina.od.ua/programmnye-tezisy-partii-rodina>, Передвиборча програма політичних партій «Руський блок». - <http://www.rblok.org.ua/pls/vd2010/printblob?pf7171=190&kodvib=400>

<sup>48</sup> Передвиборча програма політичних партій «Руський блок». - <http://www.rblok.org.ua/pls/vd2010/printblob?pf7171=190&kodvib=400>

<sup>49</sup> Програма партії. - <http://rodina.od.ua/programmnye-tezisy-partii-rodina> Передвиборча програма політичних партій «Руський блок» <http://www.rblok.org.ua/pls/vd2010/printblob?pf7171=190&kodvib=400>

60-70 - ies of XX century in the USSR are perceived negatively. Generally an extensive discourse concerning the coverage of problematic periods of history of Ukraine that is the origin of Kyiv Rus', the problem of acceptance of church union, Pereyaslav agreement between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Moscow kingdom, the activity of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, the problem of national revival of the mid-nineteenth century and prevention of this process from the official authorities of the Russian empire, the restoration of Ukrainian statehood 1917-1920 , the famine of 1932-1933, OUN-UPA, crimes of the Soviet regime is conducted between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian right-wing radical parties. All these issues are reported from the opposite points of view, and pro-Russian right-wing radical advocate more radical position than the official Russian authorities.

Both political parties treat extremely negatively towards migration. In this respect their positions are similar to the position of "Svoboda". The migrants are considered to be a threat of erosion of Russian identity and the weakening of the Orthodox Church influence. Their main activities are the conducting of rallies, pickets, various events. However, both parties resort to provocations and violent actions against pro-Ukrainian right-wing radicals, as well as against the Ukrainian cultural institutions, as it was in 2010, "Rodina" activists of the party tried to set fire to a building of "Enlightenment" society in Odessa, and were accused of murder Ukrainian activist M. Chaika. National minorities' representatives, especially the Tatars in Crimea and migrants are often the object of attack of pro-Russian right-wing wing radicals. Both political parties support the interconnection of various pro-Russian organizations: such as the Black Sea Cossacks, Devoted Cossacks and others.

Though both political parties do not any show activity in the electoral process. Only in the elections to local authorities in 2010, pro-Russian right-wing Radical Party was on its own. "Rodina" Party received 14 seats in the Odessa city council and three seats in the Odessa Regional Council, "Russian block" got nine seats in the Sevastopol city council. That position can be explained by the following factors: firstly, their leaders and members were inclined to support Party of Regions in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is viewed as a political ally because of its pro-Russian orientation. Secondly, both parties can be considered a purely regional. "Rodina" is concentrated only in the Odessa region and has no political organizations abroad. "Russian block" is concentrated primarily in the Crimea, though has its party organizations throughout Ukraine. Thirdly, too radical anti-Ukrainian position makes them potential objects of interest of intelligence services. Fourthly, the Party of Regions is trying not to allow strengthening and consolidation of pro-Russian right-wing radicals in order to not get a direct competitor in their basic regions of eastern and southern Ukraine. Instead, Party of Regions offer right-wing radicals the status of junior partner, engaging with them in electoral blocks in local elections (blocking PR and "Russian block" of Crimea in 2006), or bringing their leaders to its list during the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (such as V. Chornomorov). Fifthly, pro-Russian right-wing radical parties often experience various crises and splits. The last one took place in 2010-2011 in "Russian block" surrounding where the two leaders A. Svistunov and G. Basov can not determine who the leader of the party is. So today the activities of pro-Russian right-wing radical parties are concentrated mainly in the Crimea, Odessa and in other Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, their impact is less significant. But it should be noticed that in the ruling Party of Regions there is a number of politicians who tend to support pro-Russian right-wing radicalism, that is D. Tabachnik, Chechetov, J. Tabachnik, V. Chornomorov.

## Resume

So, modern right-wing radical parties appear in the beginning of the 90-s after the crush of Soviet Union, gaining independence of Ukraine and creation the multi-party system. From the very beginning there was obvious the division between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian parties. The main aim of the pro-Ukrainian right-wing radicals becomes the protection the of Ukraine's sovereignty from the attempts of reconstruction of the Soviet Union. These parties were not numerous but nevertheless had influence on the Ukrainian political system. Their political platforms were not structured and mostly populist. That's why they couldn't create any Partitial and electoral basis and stayed regional political forces. These first right-wing radical parties didn't become part of the Supreme Council because they didn't enough electoral support, and often acted as out of system forces. So with time they just marginalized. A lot of their ex-members joined the liberal and democratic parties – "Nasha Ukraine", "Batkivschina" and lost their radicalism. The political repressions during the actions "Ukraine without Kuchma" were the last drop in the existence of the first right-wing radical parties. The revival of the pro-Ukrainian right-wing radical parties begins 2004 and is connected with the activity of "Svoboda". During this time other right-wing radical parties didn't act, so it gave "Svoboda" opportunity to take this niche. "Svoboda" didn't repeat the mistakes of their ancestors – it builds Partitial structure, incorporates new members, acts all over Ukraine (nevertheless the basic region is still Western Ukraine). "Svoboda" successfully uses media-sources for own propaganda, cooperates with different youth subcultures. The analysis of the electoral activity of "Svoboda" shows the growth of the "Svoboda's" support among the population. If the percentage stays the same on the next elections (3%) – that means that "Svoboda" is going to be in the Supreme Council. In case of the percentage growth – till 5% - "Svoboda" is going to be on the edge.

The pro-Russian right-wing radical parties appear at the same time as the pro-Ukrainian ones and set the goal to stay under Russian control. But their activity was much weaker because the main pro-Russian forces were left-wing at that time. In the middle of 90-s their activity declines because of intra-Russian problems and absence of Russian support (Russia was too busy with contradictions between it's President and Parliament, and Chechnya). Their activity revivals in the beginning of 2000-s, but their development is inhibited by such factors as: absence of unity, concurrence from the side of "Party of Regions" which doesn't let anyone to interfere it in its regions. The activity of pro-Russian right-wing radical parties has regional character – primarily Odessa and the Crimea.